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NUMBER I

The author of this article drafted a statute for Indiana which sought
to resolve certain problems caused by dormant mineral interests. Even
though Indiana adopted his draft, Professor Polston's continuing concern that such mineral interests interfere with land marketability and
his dissatisfaction with portions of the Indiana statute led him to reconsider his draft. After studying different methods which seek to
free land from dormant mineral interests, he proposes the Indiana
statute, with certain revisions, as a model.

LEGISLATION, EXISTING AND
PROPOSED, CONCERNING MARKETABILITY OF MINERAL TITLES
Ronald W. Polston*
T is becoming increasingly apparent in jurisdictions which
have a long established coal or oil and gas industry that
something must be done to eliminate title problems stemming
from mineral conveyances executed in years gone by.' The
problem results from the fact that perpetual or very long term
mineral interests may be created during a period of activity
in a particular industry, and these interests do not termniate
when the activity ceases. Ownership of the minerals may thus
be lodged in individuals who have long disappeared from the
area, leaving no trace, and making it impossible to further develop the mineral estate at this time.
The problem is inherent in our common law system in
which a separate estate, which may be in fee simple absolute,
Professor of Law, Indianapolis Law School; B.S., Eastern Illinois
University; L.L.B., University of Illinois; Member of the Illinois and
Indiana Bar Associations.
1. The problem is discussed in the following: SIMES & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 239 (1960); Dupuy, Clouds on
Title, 18 TEXAs B.J. 275 (1955) ; Street, Need for Legislation to Eliminate
Dormant Royalty Interests, 42 MICH. ST. B.J. 49 (1963); Note, Severed
Mineral Interests, A Problem Without A Solution, 46 N. DAK. L. REV. 451
(1970).
*Associate
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may be created in the minerals.' Such a mineral interest has
all the sanctity of an estate in land generally in that title to it
cannot be lost by abandonment,' and yet it is virtually immune
to the various title curative devices, such as adverse possession, the tax deed, and the marketable title act, which keep
land in the stream of commerce.
ADVERSE POSSESSION

Adverse possession is for practical purposes inapplicable
to the severed mineral estate because it is generally held that
possession of the surface does not carry with it possession of
the severed mineral interest.' The only way one can obtain
title to the severed mineral interest by adverse possession is
by actually producing the minerals for the requisite number
2. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 978 (1957).
3. The statement in the text appears to be universally true with respect to
solid minerals (see note 2 supra) but not so with respect to oil and gas.
Because of the fluid nature of oil and gas, courts have had difficulty
deciding whether or not they may be the subject of ownership in place,
some courts giving an affirmative answer and classifying interests therein
as corporeal. See, e.g., Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W.
345 (1923) ; Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W. 296
(1923). Other courts answer in the negative, terming the interests incorporeal. See, e.g., Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1968); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131
N.E. 645 (1921). The principal consequence of this dispute seems to be its
effect on the question of abandonment. Theoretically, if it is classified as
incorporeal, title to it may be lost by abandonment; otherwise, it may not
be. The last statement appears to be true in theory only, however, for while
a jurisdiction which classifies the interest as incorporeal may apply principles of abandonment to it, other such jurisdictions may not. Compare
Gerhard v. Stephens, supra, with Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin
Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943). Not only are the cases confusing on this matter, the writers on the subject seem to also disagree. In
1A SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 139, at 320 (1954) it is said:
"[Iln all states, except Louisiana . . . such [an] estate or interest is not
subject to termination by nonuser or abandonment." In 1 WiLLiMS &
MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 210.1, at 107 (1970) it is said: "In states which
classify a mineral interest or leasehold . . . as incorporeal in character, it
has been held that such interest may be extinguished by abandonment." It
would appear that the only decision cited by Williams and Meyers which
clearly holds that a severed mineral interest, as opposed to an oil and gas
leasehold estate, is subject to abandonment is Gerhard v. Stephens, supra.
See Discussion Notes, 31 OIL & GAS REP. 84-85 (1969). That decision cited
as its principal authority the quoted statement from Williams and Meyers.
Even if oil and gas interests were held to be subject to abandonment, problems of marketability of title would not thereby be ended. No title could
be cleared without litigation in which the outcome would never be certain.
4. Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1929) ; Ward v. Woods,
310 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1958) ; Wilson v. Eckles, 232 Miss. 577, 99 So. 2d 846
(1958); Meiners v. Texas Osage Cooperative Royalty Pool Inc., 309 S.W.2d
898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Possession of the surface commenced prior to
severance will, however, result in the acquisition of title to both surface
and minerals, despite a subsequent severance by the record owner. Huddleston v. Peel, 238 Miss. 798, 119 So. 2d 921 (1960); Rio Brava Oil Co. v.
Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S.W.2d 293 (1942).
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of years,5 and, of course, no one is going to expend the money
necessary to produce minerals unless he has title.
MARKETABLE TITLE STATUTES

The Model Marketable Title Act 6 and statutes based thereon provide little relief. Those statutes operate upon record
title and render it marketable as against defects arising prior
to the root of title. Root of title, under the Model Act, must
be an instrument that has been of record at least forty years
prior to the date on which marketability becomes an issue."
Such a statute could and probably will, where adopted, eliminate many dormant mineral interests! The weakness of the
statute in this regard, however, is that it does not eliminate
any "defects which are inherent in the muniments of which
such chain of record title is formed. '"9 Thus if the land has
been conveyed expressly subject to outstanding mineral interests within the prescribed period, as it most likely will be
if such interests exist,1" the statute will not affect them.'
Marketable title statutes, therefore, simply do not reach the
real problem involved in marketability of mineral interests.
Mineral titles are likely to become unmarketable after the
activity has played out in a given area. Those who acquired
the interests will have moved on to other sites of mineral activity, perhaps even to that great oil well in the sky. Thus the
key factor in regard to marketability of mineral interests is
activity. Some method of terminating mineral interests after
a period of inactivity seems the best means of insuring marketability of mineral interests. The marketable title statutes,
which seek to eliminate claims that have become stale of record,
do not meet the problem because mineral titles have a way of
staying fresh of record. What is needed is a statute that will
5. Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College, 351 Ill. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (1932);

Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
6. For a copy of the act see SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 6.
7. In Indiana the period is fifty years. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1102 (Supp.
1970). In Oklahoma it is thirty years. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 72
(Supp. 1970).
8. For a discussion of the effect of the act on mineral interests and the need
for further legislation in the area see SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239.
9. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 7 (Model Marketable Title Act § 2).
10. STREET, supra note 1, at 52.
11. The Oklahoma version of the Model Marketable Title Act is expressly
inapplicable to mineral interests. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 76 (Supp.
1970).
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eliminate dormant mineral interests regardless of the state
of record title.
TAx SAT.s
The tax sale may in some areas provide a means of clearing title, but it is certainly not a universal nor entirely satisfactory solution to the problem. It is totally unavailable unless
the tax laws provide for separate assessment of the mineral
estate,1" and even in those states where separate assessment is
permitted tax assessors do not always do so.'" If there is no
separate assessment, there is, of course, no tax sale. Even if
there is a separate assessment and a tax sale, there is no assurance that the problems created by separate ownership will be
ended. In addition to the infirmities of tax titles generally,
there is the problem that it may be purchased by one other than
the surface owner who may thereafter lose interest in maintaining his ownership. It would seem that the best solution to
this problem would be to find a means of ultimately reuniting
surface and mineral ownership. Not only would the ends of
marketability be better served thereby, but it would also seem
to more nearly fulfill the expectations landowners generally
have in this regard. These expectations seem justified not
only on the basis that the common law rule, i.e., property extends from the center of the earth to the heavens, reflects
popular beliefs, but also on the basis that development of the
mineral estate will be a burden upon the surface owner and
if anyone is to have control of it, as a windfall, it should be
him. 14
THE

SEVERED MINERAL FEE

Not only is the mineral estate thus immune to the various
means evolved for keeping real estate in the stream of commerce, it is by its nature more likely to fall into an unmarket12. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 667, 209 P.2d 166 (1948); ALA.
CODE tit. 61, § 16 (Supp. 1969).
13. See STREET, supra note 1, at 51. See also the facts in Failoni v. Chicago
& North Western Ry. Co., 30 Ill. 2d 258, 195 N.E.2d 619 (1964) which
illustrate that assessors do not always assess nonproductive mineral
interests.
14. But cf. DuPuy, supra note 1 (suggesting that the problem can be solved
by means of taxation).
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able state, being concealed and out of mind except during
periods of exploration or production. The existence of such
interests may create no physical inconvenience during periods
of inactivity, but they do cause inconvenience every time there
is a transfer of the property. In fact there are no doubt instances in which the existence of such interests has prevented
transfer of the property. It is unlikely, for example, that one
who was contemplating building a luxury motel would take
title if there was the potential of an oil well being drilled in
the front lawn.
One possible solution to the problem would be to prohibit
separate ownership in fee of mineral interests. Such a solution
would appeal to those who find their titles burdened by dormant mineral interests. Any attempt, however, to terminate
existing fee ownerships would no doubt be met by constitutional objections.1 5 Further than that, however, the real evil
of severed ownership is that which results from ownership
being outstanding in persons who have no interest in or, perhaps, knowledge of their ownership. It would not seem necessary to abandon the concept to alleviate that evil. The concept
of ownership in fee of severed mineral interests has become
an integral part of the various mineral industries, and is
utilized extensively in at least the coal and oil and gas
industries.
Actually the coal industry is more dependent on being
able to own mineral deposits in fee than is the oil and gas
industry, and the difference is due to the mechanics of production in the two industries. In the coal industry it is possible
by test drillings to determine the extent of a deposit before
making the expenditure necessary to develop it. If it is determined that it would not be economical to develop the deposit
at any given time, the coal company may nevertheless want
to hold it pending new developments in mining technique or
changes in the market. Furthermore, once a mine is opened it
may be many years before the deposit is exhausted, and it will
therefore be more convenient to the developer to own in fee
the coal under all the tracts overlying the seam. Thus coal
15. For a discussion of the constitutionality of legislation of this sort affecting
property interests see SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 255,
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is typically developed on the basis of fee ownership, and any
rule of law which prohibited such ownership would be unduly
burdensome to the coal industry.
In the oil and gas industry, on the other hand, development is typically under a determinable interest- the oil and
gas lease. Such an instrument is typically for a short term
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the
premises. This is no doubt due to the fact that the oil and
gas developer is never sure that oil and gas exists until he
drills. Once he drills he has already expended a major part
of developmental costs, and, if oil and gas exist in sufficient
quantities to justify completion of the well, he produces it.
There is no thought of acquiring ownership of the deposit and
keeping it in reserve for the future. However, ownership in
fee does have a place in the oil industry but it is largely
used by the investor, speculator, or transferring landowner
who wishes to reserve to himself a part of the mineral potential.
Thus the problem of severed ownership remains, and the
question must be faced as to possible solutions. Remembering that the objective is to keep ownership of such interests
in a marketable state, the best answer seems to be to find some
means of reuniting surface and mineral ownership in those
situations where it is likely to become unmarketable, without
at the same time unduly limiting the ownership concepts
upon which the developmental industries depend.
SOME STATUTORY APPROACHES

Thus far five jurisdictions have attacked the problem
directly, and none of them have come up with a completely
satisfactory solution. Statutes adopted in Tennessee, 6 Michi16.

TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 64-704

(Supp. 1970)

provides in pertinent part as

follows:
Any lease of oil or natural gas rights or any other conveyance of
any kind separating such rights from the freehold estate of land
shall expire at the end of ten (10) years from the date executed,
unless, at the end of such ten (10) years, natural gas or oil is being
produced from said land for commercial purposes. If, at any time
after said ten (10) years' period, commercial production of oil or
natural gas shall be terminated for a period of six (6) months, all
such rights shall revert to the owner of the estate out of which said
leasehold gstate was carved....
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gan,17 and Illinois,"5 for example,
terests and do not apply to coal
least one of those jurisdictions a
results from ancient conveyances

affect only oil and gas inand other minerals. In at
major part of the problem
of coal and other minerals,

17. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1163(1)-(2) (1970) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Section 1. Any interest in oil or gas in any land owned by any
person other than the owner of the surface, which has not been sold,
leased, mortgaged or transfered by instrument recorded in the
register of deeds office for the county where such interest is located
for a period of 20 years shall, in the absence of the issuance of a
drilling permit as to such interest or the actual production or withdrawal of oil or gas from said lands, or from lands covered by a
lease to which such interest is subject, or from lands pooled, unitized
or included in unit operations therewith, or the use of such interest in underground gas storage operations, during such period
of 20 years, be deemed abandoned, unless the onwer thereof shall,
within 3 years after the effective date of this act or within 20 years
after the last sale, lease, mortgage or transfer of record of such
interest or within 20 years after the last issuance of a drilling permit as to such interest or actual production or withdrawal of oil or
gas, from said lands, or from lands covered by a lease to which such
interest is subject, or from lands pooled, unitized, or included in unit
operations therewith, or the use of such interest in underground
gas storage operations, whichever is later, record a claim of interest
as hereinafter provided. Any interest in oil or gas deemed abandoned as herein provided shall vest as of the date of such abandonment in the owner or owners of the surface in keeping with the character of the surface ownership.
Section 2. Any interest in oil or gas referred to in this act
may be preserved by the recording within the period specified in
this act a written notice in the register of deeds office for the
county where such interest is located ...
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 30, §§ 197, 198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) provides in
pertinent part as follows:
Any interest in oil, gas, or associated hydrocarbons, liquid or
gaseous, in any land owned by anyone other than the owner of the
surface, which has not been devised, sold, leased, mortgaged or
transferred b yinstrument recorded in the office of the recorder of
deeds in the county where such interest is located for a period of 25
years shall, in the absence of the actual production of oil, gas or
associated hydrocarbons, liquid or gaseous, from such land, or from
lands covered by a lease to which such interest is subject, or from
lands pooled, unitized or included in unit operations therewith,
during such period of 25 years, be deemed abandoned, unless the
owner thereof, within 3 years after the effective date of this Act
or within 25 years after the last devise, sale, lease, mortgage or
transfer of record of such interest or actual production of oil, gas
or associated hydrocarbons, liquid or gaseous, from such land, or
from lands covered by a lease to which such interest is subject, or
from lands pooled, unitized, or included in unit operations therewith,
whichever is later, records a claim of interest as provided in this
Act. Any interest in oil, gas or associated hydrocarbons, liquid or
gaseous, deemed abandoned as herein provided shall vest as of the
date of such abandonment in the owner of the surface.
Any interest of oil, gas or associated hydrocarbons, liquid or
gaseous, referred to in this Act may be preserved by the recording
within the period specified in this Act a written notice in the recorder's office for the county where such interest is located....
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which have been construed in that jurisdiction to include oil
and gas.1 9 A fourth statute, that of Virginia, 0 while covering
19. Nance v. Donk Bros. Coal and Coke Co., 13 Ill. 2d 399, 151 N.E.2d 97
(1958).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-154 (Supp. 1970) provides:
In any case when a claim to minerals, coals, oils, ores or subsurface substances, in, on or under lands in the Commonwealth,
except lands lying west of the Blue Ridge mountains other than in
counties having a population of more than sixteen thousand five
hundred but less than sixteen thousand nine hundred, or more than
thirty-two thousand but less than thirty-two thousand nine hundred
fortly, or more than thirty thousand but less than thirty-one thousand, of more than fifteen thousand seven hundred but less than sixteen thousand, of more than sixty thousand but less than seventy
thousand, or more than five thousand but less than five thousand
three hundred fifty, and of more than twenty-six thousand six
hundred and [sic] seventy but less than twenty-six thousand eight
hundred, of more than twenty-six thousand three hundred but less
than twenty-seven thousand five hundred twenty-five or in any
county having population of more than twenty-one thousand nine
hundred fifty but less than twenty-two thousand, or in the case of
manganese ores only in counties having a population of more than
twenty-one thousand three hundred and less than twenty-one thousand nine hundred or in any county having a population of more
than forty-three thousand but less than fifty thousand, or the right
to enter such land for the purpose of exploring, mining, boring and
sinking shafts for such minerals, coal, oil, ores or subsurface substances is derived or reserved by any writing made thirty-five
years or more prior to the institution of the suit hereinafter mentioned, and
(a) Such right to explore or mine has not for a like period
been exercised and for a like period the person having such claim
or right has never been charged with taxes thereon but all the taxes
on the land have been charged to and paid by the person holding the
land subject thereto, and for a like period no deed of bargain and
sale of such claim or reservation in such mineral rights in the lands
embraced in such claim has been recorded in the clerk's office of the
county wherein the lands are located; or
(b) When the right to explore and mine has been exercised
and the minerals, coals, oil, ores and subsurface substances in or on
the land have been exhausted and the right of mining or boring
has been abandoned for a like period;
It shall be prima facie presumed that no minerals, coals, oil,
ores or subsurface substances exist in, on or under such land.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-155 (Repl. 1969) provides:
The owner or owners of the land subject to such claim or right
separately or jointly may bring a suit in equity in the circuit
court of the county wherein the land, or a part thereof, is situated
praying for the extinguishment of such claim or right, to which
suit shall be made party defendant the person by whom such claim
by such writing was derived or reserved, or his successors in title,
by name so far as known, and as defendants unknown, so far as such
successors in title are unknown. The court shall allow a period of
not less than six months from the time the cause is docketed and
set for hearing to elapse within which time the defendant may explore and discover commercial minerals, cials, oils, ores or subsurface substances, if any, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence
to the contrary, it shall be presumed that there are no commercial
minerals, coals, oil, ores or subsurface substances in or on the land,
and the court shall enter a decree declaring the claim or right to be
a cloud on the title and releasing the land therefrom and extinguishing the same; but if the defendant or defendants shall thereupon prove that there are commercial minerals, coals, oils, ores or
subsurface substances in or on the land, the court shall require
such minerals, coals, oils, ores or subsurface substances to be
charged with taxes according to law.
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coal, contains such peculiar geographical limitations that one
wonders how it ever passed the test of constitutionality."
The fifth attempt to cope with the situation, and the one
upon which the other four seem to be based, is found in
Louisiana. In Louisiana existing code provisions 2 relating
to incorporeal interests generally have for sometime been
applied to mineral interests.23 Those code provisions, which
incorporate the doctrine of liberative prescription, provide
essentially that an incorporeal interest which is unused for a
period of ten years shall prescribe in favor of the owner of
the land. Thus a mineral interest which is nonproductive for
a period of ten years terminates, and ownership reverts to the
owner of the surface. While seemingly a simple doctrine, the
attempt to apply it to the complexities of mineral ownership
has produced volumes of decided cases that incorporate a body
of law that is on many questions confusing and inconsistent,
and, on others, harsh and burdensome on the mineral interests
involved. The mere fact that it has spawned hundreds of decided appellate cases" is of itself enough to give pause to any
jurisdiction considering it as a model for legislation.
One of the frequently litigated questions in Louisiana
relates to the failure of the code provisions to define the geographical extent of the interest upon which the doctrine will
operate. Thus if two or more noncontiguous tracts of land
are covered by a single instrument which transfers a mineral
interest to a single grantee, the question arises as to whether
the instrument creates one or more mineral interests. The
question becomes critical when there is production from only
one of such tracts. If more than one mineral interest is created, then those tracts upon which there is no production are
liberated by prescription. The Louisiana courts have held
that such an instrument creates as many mineral interests as
there are noncontiguous tracts and that liberative prescription
21. Love v. Lynchburg Natl Bank & Trust Co., 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650
(1965) held the statute to be constitutional.
22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 789, 3546 (West 1953).
23. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1920).
24. See Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A
Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute
(pts. 1-2), 25 TULANE L. REV. 30, 155, 303, 485 (1951); Id. (pts. 2-3), 26
TULANE L. REV. 23, 172, 303 (1952).
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applies to each of them separately.25 This has been carried to
the point where a tract of land that is divided by a highway,
railroad, or stream26 is considered to be two tracts, but one
divided by a private easement 27 is only one tract. In a similar
manner it has been held that, if two contiguous tracts are
transferred in separate instruments, two mineral interests are
created. 8 While the result of these cases would not seem particularly objectionable, it would seem that any legislation on
the subject should define the geographical extent of a mineral
interest sufficiently to avoid the prospect of the extensive
amount of litigation which has resulted from a failure to do
so in Louisiana.
Another problem that would exist if the Louisiana doctrine were adopted in toto in other jurisdictions lies in the fact
that no exception is made in favor of the owner of coal interests2 9 to the requirement that every tract must produce or
prescribe. While Louisiana is apparently not a coal producing state, 0 the failure to make such an exception could cause
problems in a jurisdiction that is a coal producer. Production
from a seam of coal may not reach some of the tracts overlying the seam within the ten year period. Thus a developer of
the coal might find that his interest in portions of the seam
had expired before he reached them. While it might seem possible to alleviate this objection to the Louisiana doctrine by
either providing for a longer prescriptive period or providing
that any production from a seam of coal would be deemed production from the entire seem, the Louisiana doctrine even if so
modified would still not be conducive to the operation of the
coal industry in that it would be inconsistent with their practice of maintaining deposits in reserve.
For list of cases see 1A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS, 331 (1954).
Id. at 332-34.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 332.
That liberative prescription applies to solid minerals is well established.
Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Huie
Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922);
Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report
to the Mineral Law Connittee of the Louisiana State Law Institute (pt. 2),
25 TULANE L. REV. 155, 170 (1951). While no cases have been found directly
on the question, there is nothing in the doctrine to suggest that any exceptions would be made in favor of solid minerals.
30. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 654 (1970).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/4

10

Polston: Legislation, Existing and Proposed, concerning Market-Ability of

1972

MAIKETABILITY OF MINERAL TITLES

Another major problem with the Louisiana doctrine is
illustrated by cases dealing with the question of divisibility of
the mineral interest. It arises when there has been a subdivision of the mineral interest. A grantee of the minerals may
convey all or part of his interest to others by creating undivided interests, interests in only a portion of the tract, or
interests in a given strata. The situation may be further complicated by each of those subdividees further subdividing,
creating several levels of ownership in the mineral estate. If,
in such a situation, there is production from the land in which
only part of the subdividees are entitled to participate, the
question is then raised as to whether those mineral interests
which are not participating in production are being "used"
so as to prevent their prescribing under the provisions of the
doctrine. In other words, the question is whether a subdivision
of the mineral interests creates several new mineral interests
upon which the doctrine will operate separately. The issue is
difficult to resolve under the Louisiana doctrine and all the
statutes based on it, none of which expressly cover the matter
because of the fact that under all of them the reversion, when
an interest is terminated, operates only in favor of the surface
owner. If a court holds that a subdividee's interest is terminated, the rights of the surface owner are thus increased solely
because of the fact that the interest was subdivided. In the
absence of subdivision, production from any part of the tract
would have preserved the entire mineral interest. It seems
unfair and illogical to hold that the surface owner should benefit from subsequent conveyances of the mineral interest to
which he was not a party and in which he was not intended to
be benefited. 8 On the other hand, unless subdivisions of the
mineral interest are separately subject to termination for
nonuser, the policy of the doctrine is to that extent unfulfilled.
It might happen, for example, that a subdividee who was not
31. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1946) the
Louisiana court seemed troubled by this aspect of its decision but resolved
the issue by saying:
But the fact that the landowner was not a party to that transIn fact the division
action does not distinguish the instant case ....
of the advantage of the servitude was a matter to which the landowner had no interest in objecting, because it was essentially advantageous to the landowner, in that it required each one of the owners
of the servitude thereafter to develop that part of the land on which
he acquired or retained the servitude, in order to prevent its
being lost by the prescription of 10 years. Id. at 752.
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entitled to share in production would disappear from the
scene, making title to the portion of the tract which was subject to his interest unmarketable. To resolve this apparent
dilemma it would seem logical to make the doctrine applicable
to each subdividee's interest separately, but to provide for it
to revert to his subdivider upon termination. While it may be
desirable policy to ultimately reunite the surface and mineral
estate and thereby bestow a windfall on the surface owner,
there would seem to be no justification for doing so in those
situations where others have a better claim to it. To award the
terminating interest to the immediate subdivider would be to
regard each level of ownership as a single unit except as between the parties to the transaction which resulted in the subdivision, thus obviating the unfair and illogical result that
persons other than those who are parties to the transaction are
being benefited by it.
The Louisiana legislature and courts have struggled for
years with the divisibility versus indivisibility question. No
small part of the enormous number of litigated cases relating
to liberative prescription have involved this question.
Initially the Louisiana courts held that the mineral interests were indivisible.3 2 The case involved was one in which
one of several co-owners of the mineral interest was a minor
during a portion of the prescriptive period. Under the applicable code provision, the running of the period was held to be
suspended not only as to the minor but also as to all of the
co-owners in a decision in which the court said:
[A]s to an indivisible real right or servitude, where
the prescription applicable to it is suspended as to
one of several joint owners of the right, it is suspended as to all of them, and this necessarily so, because an indivisible right or obligation cannot be
extinguished in part and exist in part."3
Suspension of the period is, of course, possible by means
of "use" of the mineral interest as well as by the minority of
the owner, and the language of the case would suggest that
suspension in favor of one co-owner by that means would also
32. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
33. Id. at 40.
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preserve the interest of all co-owners. In Hodges v. Norton "
that question was presented. In that case, A (Hodges) sold a
440 acre tract in 1915 to B, reserving 1/2 the minerals under
the land. A in 1923 sold 1/ of her reserved interest, or 1/4 of
the minerals, to C who in the same year sold his 1/4 under a
particular 220 acres of the 440 to D. Production on portions
of the 440 acre tract other than the 220 acres in which D had an
interest commenced in 1924 and continued until 1931. There
was no production on D's 220 acres until the production involved in the suit was obtained in 1939. It was contended in
the suit that D's interest had prescribed because there had
been no production on the tract to which D's interest related
for more than ten years after its creation. The court reaffirmed the rule of indivisibility announced in Sample v.
5 and held that
Whitaker"
D's interest had not prescribed.
It was reasoned that a single mineral interest had been created
when A reserved 1/ the minerals and that the entire mineral
interest was preserved or prescribed as a unit, regardless of
subsequent transfers of part of it.
Indivisibility seemed well established in Louisiana law
until the two cases of Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson" and Byrd
v. Forgotson7 were decided. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson an
undivided 1/4 interest in 240 acres was transferred to A in
1921. In the same year A transferred to B his 1/4 interest in
40 acres of the 240 acre tract. Oil was produced until the
time of the suit from the portion in which B did not have an
interest. Oil had not been produced from B's 40 acres since
1929. The court held that B's interest prescribed in 1939, and
in doing so said:
The decision [in Hodges v. Norton"] is reconcilable
with the judgment rendered in the instant case ...
by the fact that in Hodges v. Norton, Mrs. Augusta
Ann Hodges and her ten children, who were colessors
with the landowner ... in the lease under which the
drilling operations were conducted, retained a one34. 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942).
35. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931). See text accompanying notes 32 and 33
supra.
36. 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1946).
37. 213 La. 276, 34 So. 2d 777 (1945), rev'd on rehearing, 34 So. 2d 781 (La.
1947).
38. 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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fourth mineral interest in the whole 440 acres conveyed by the original mineral servitude. In the instant case there was no such joint ownership of the
mineral rights by Clark and the Toklan Royalty
Corp. [A and B]."
Byrd v. Forgotson4" was similar to Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, except that in the Byrd case it was contended that the
minority of a co-owner of minerals under a part of the tract
would preserve the interests of those who had interests in
other parts of the tract. In its first opinion4 1 the court followed its original holding in Sample v. Whitaker4 2 and preserved all interests. On rehearing, 3 however, the opinion was
changed to make it consistent with Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson
by holding that only the interest of the minors were preserved.
While the court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson stated that
its decision was consistent with Hodges v. Norton, it quite
clearly was not with respect to the question of divisibility of
interests. Subsequent cases have done nothing to clear up
the conflict. In fact in Gunby v. CommercialSolvents4 the confusion was compounded. In that case 0 was the owner of a
large tract of land that consisted of three contiguous tracts,
A, B, and C. In 1939 0 transferred a 1/4 interest in tract C
to Gunby. In 1952 0 sold the whole plantation to Commercial
Solvents, reserving all the oil and gas and other minerals.
Production was obtained on tracts A and C. Commercial Solvents contended that tract B had prescribed on the basis that
Gunby's purchase and a lease on tract A had resulted in the
division of the plantation into three tracts for purposes of
prescription. While the application of the doctrine to Gunby's
interest separately was not involved and the issue in Hodges
v. Norton and Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson was therefore not
present, the court said:
Our courts have repeatedly held that a mineral servitude which covers the whole of a tract of land is one
39. 213 La.
40. 213 La.
1947).
41. 213 La.
42. 172 La.

183, 34 So. 2d 746, 754 (1946).
276, 34 So. 2d 777 (1945), rev'd on rehearing, 34 So. 2d 781 (La.
276, 34 So. 2d 777 (1945).
722, 135 So. 83 (1931). See text accompanying notes 32 and 33

eupra.

43. 34 So. 2d 781 (La. 1947).
44. 170 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 1964).
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servitude subject to one user and continues to exist
as such even though fractional mineral interests are
outstanding on portions of the property subject to
the single servitude."
The Louisiana legislature resolved one of the questions
frequently involved in the divisibility cases by first providing
that suspension of prescription in favor of a minor would not
result in suspension in favor of his co-owners ;46 subsequently
the legislature provided that prescription would not be suspended because of minority of the owner."
Another frequently litigated issue in Louisiana, and one
which is often involved in discussions of divisibility, concerns
the question as to when production will interrupt prescription
on tracts other than that from which the production is obtained. While related to the question of divisibility, it arises
in the situation in which a portion of the tract is included in
a voluntary or compulsory production unit. When unitization
occurs production is divided among the owners of interests in
all the land covered by the unit, regardless of where the wells
may be located. When only a portion of a tract which is subject to a mineral servitude is included in a unit and there is
production only on other land in the unit, the question arises
as to whether prescription is interrupted as to all or any part
of the servitude. The Louisiana courts have held that only
that part of the servitude which is included in the unit is
preserved by production from other lands in the unit,"' but
that if production is from the land covered by the servitude,
the entire servitude is preserved. 9 These decisions are, of
course, consistent with the doctrine of divisibility as developed
by the Louisiana court. Whatever position is taken on this
doctrine, however, any legislation on the subject should expressly cover the effect of pooling and unitization. Only the
Michigan"0 and Illinois51 statutes do so.
45. Id. at 263. For this proposition the court cited Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clement,
239 La. 144, 118 So. 2d 361 (1960) ; Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d
618 (1942) ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1946).
46. No. 232 [1944] La. Acts 687.
47. No. 510 [1950] La. Acts 935. This statute and No. 232 [1944] La. Acts
687 are now incorporated in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5805 (1950).
48. Elson v. Mathews, 224 La. 417, 69 So. 2d 734 (1953); Spears v. Nesbitt,
197 La. 931, 2 So. 2d 650 (1941).
49. Fontenot v. Texaco Inc., 271 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1967).
50. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1163 (1)-(2) (1970).
51. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 197, 198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
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The four statutes that have been adopted relating to this
problem are all patterned, generally speaking, on the Louisiana doctrine in that all of them terminate an interest after a
period of nonuser, and they incorporate, for the most part,
the weaknesses of the Louisiana system. One exception to the
latter statement lies in the fact that all of them, except the
Tennessee statute, provide for a means of extending the interest other than by production, such as by execution and recording of a conveyance of the interest or by recording a claim
within the prescriptive period. Thus the policy approach in
those statutes is somewhat different than that of the Louisiana doctrine. They are aimed at the problem of marketability
while the Louisiana doctrine is a limitation on the duration of
ownership of mineral interests.
None of the four statutes, in a manner similar to the
Louisiana doctrine, however, defines the geographical extent
of a mineral interest. Thus in a period of oil activity all of
them would be likely to produce litigation concerning the
effect of contiguous and noncontiguous tracts being included
in a single conveyance.
Nor do any of the four statutes deal with the question of
divisibility of mineral interests, and all of them seem to operate only in favor of the surface owner. Thus, built into all of
them is the same problem with which the Louisiana courts have
so long struggled. The only possible exception to this statement is the Tennessee statute. Under that statute it is provided that the reversion will operate in favor of "the owner52
of the estate out of which said leasehold was carved."
While the use of the quoted phrase would seem to indicate
that the statute could operate in favor of a subdividing mineral owner, the balance of the statute would not seem to support
such a conclusion. In the first portion it is made applicable
only to "[a] ny lease of oil or natural gas rights or any other
conveyance of any kind separatingsuch rights from the freehold estate of land." 3 (emphasis added). If the statute only
affects mineral interests created by the initial severence deed,
then quite obviously it would not be available to the subdividing mineral owner, and therefore "the owner of the estate out
52.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-704 (Supp. 1970).

53. Id.
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of which said leasehold was carved" 5 4 will always be the surface owner. Furthermore, as is obvious from the quoted language, there is some question as to whether the Tennessee statute would apply to anything other than oil and gas leases.
While in the first sentence it is made applicable to "any other
conveyance," the reverter clause ("out of which said leasehold estate was carved") seems more restrictive. If it applies
only to oil and gas leases then it will not only have failed to
eliminate questions relating to subdivisions, it will not have
had much effect at all. It provides for termination at the end
of ten years in the absence of production, and further provides that the cessation of production for a period of six
months after the end of ten years shall also result in termination. Most oil and gas leases have a primary term of less than
ten years and provide for termination upon cessation of production. The statute would therefore not affect them.
The Virginia statute has many peculiarities other than
its unusual geographical limitations.5 5 Essentially it provides
that when a mineral interest has not been transferred or
separately taxed or when exploration has not been conducted
thereunder for a period of thirty-five years the land covered
thereby shall be prima facie deemed to contain no minerals.56
The surface owner is thereafter entitled to bring a suit to quiet
title to such mineral interest. If the mineral owner defends,
he is given six months from the date of the hearing in which
to explore for minerals. If he can, within that six month
period, establish that there are minerals, the court will order
the mineral interest to be separately taxed. If he fails to establish the existence of minerals, the interest is extinguished. 7
How the statute would affect a nonexecutive mineral interest
(one in which there is no right to explore for minerals) is not
clear. Perhaps the most serious objection to the statute, however, is its requirement of a lawsuit in every case in which
title is to be cleared. This being true, it is unlikely that the
statute can ever be completely effective. It may be availed of
in those few instances when title to the minerals becomes criti54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-154 (Supp. 1970).

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-155 (Repl. 1969).
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cal enough to warrant the expense of litigation, but it seems
unlikely that it will clear any substantial number of clouded
titles.
A

MODEL STATUTE

A statute which attempts to avoid the deficiencies in
existing legislation on the subject was enacted in Indiana in
1971." With some modification"9 it is offered herewith as a
model:
Sec. 1. Any interest in coal, oil and gas, and
other minerals, shall, if unused for a period of 20
years, be extinguished, unless a statement of claim
is filed in accordance with section four hereof, and
the ownership shall revert to the then"0 owner of the
interest out of which it was carved. The owner of
the interest out of which another interest was carved
shall be deemed to have been the transferor who created the interest except that if a transferor, in a
single transaction shall have transferred his entire
interest to more than one transferee, whether by
divided or undivided interests, the grantees shall collectively be deemed to have been the owners of the
interest out of which each of their interests were
carved.1
Sec. 2. A mineral interest is that interest created in favor of an individual, corporation or other
legal entity, in a single transaction. A transaction
shall be taken to include a transfer by grant, reservation, exception, or assignment or by will or inte58. Pub. L. No. 423, [1971] Ind. Laws 1970, amending IND. CODE § 32-5-11
(1971).
59. The Indiana statute was drafted by this writer at the request and with the
assistance of Indiana General Assemblyman, M. K. Phillips. During the
writing of this article it was assumed that the statute had not passed the
Indiana Legislature. After the article was completed, it was discovered
that the statute had gone through the Indiana Senate just before midnight
the last day on which it could have passed. This writer had been erroneously informed by the legislative council the next day that the statute had not
passed. In the preparation of this article substantial improvements were
therefore made in the statute, and they are reflected in the proposed draft.
It is anticipated that the changes will be introduced in the next session of
the Indiana Legislature as amendments to the Indiana statute.
60. The word "then" is used to insure that the reversion will operate in favor
of the current owner of the interest "out of which the mineral interest was
carved." The balance of the section uses the past tense to harmonize with
such an intent.
61. The last sentence of this section was not included in the Indiana statute.
For an explanation of the necessity for this change see pp. 94-95 infra and
hypotheticals (c) and (d) pp. 96-97 in/ra.
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state succession, or any other means, of an interest
of any kind, in coal, oil and gas, or other minerals. 2
Sec. 3. A mineral interest shall be deemed to be
used when there are any minerals produced thereunder, or when operations are being conducted thereunder for injection, withdrawal, storage, or disposal
of water, gas or other fluid substances, or when rentals or royalties are being paid by the owner thereof
on a regular basis in intervals no greater than one
year, or when there is production on any tract
with which such mineral interest, or any part
thereof, may be unitized or pooled for production
purposes, or when, in the case of coal or other solid
minerals, there is production from a common vein or
or seam by the owner of such mineral interest, or
when taxes are paid on such mineral interest by the
owner thereof, or when natural gas is injected and
stored underground pursuant to an instrument authorizing such use."3
Sec. 4. The statement of claim provided in section one above shall be filed by the owner of the mineral interest prior to the end of the twenty year period set forth in section one or within two years after
the effective date of this act, whichever is later, and
shall contain the name and address of the owner of
such interest, a description of the land, on or under
which such mineral interest is located, and a statement of the intended use of such mineral interest.
Such statement of claim shall be filed in the office of
the Recorder of Deeds in the county in which such
land is located. Upon the filing of the statement of
62. This section differs from the Indiana staute which defines a mineral
interest as that which is created "by an instrument transferring, either by
grant, assignment, or reservation, or otherwise an interest, of any kind, in
coal, oil and gas, and other minerals." Pub. L. No. 423, § 2, [1971] Ind.
Laws 1970. The Indiana statute could be construed as creating a single
mineral interest when an instrument transfers minerals to several persons.
The intent was to define a mineral interest as the interest created in an
individual by an instrument so that when an instrument runs in favor of
more than one grantee, each will have a mineral interest, the extent of
which is determined by the instrument. The proposed statute more clearly
reflects that intent. Furthermore, the Indiana statute by emphasizing the
instrument would seem to exclude intestate transfers which should be held
to create mineral interests in the takers.
63. The Indiana statute, instead of containing an express exception with regard
to gas storage, contained a sentence on this point as follows: "Any use
pursuant to or authorized by the instrument creating such mineral interest
shall be effective to continue in force all rights granted by such instrument."
Pub. L. No. 423, § 3, [1971] Ind. Laws 1970. It is suggested that the
language used in the Indiana statute is too broad and that the last clause
of the proposed draft of this section is a more desirable way of handling
that situation.
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claim within the time provided, it shall be deemed
that such mineral interest was being used on the date
on which the statement of claim was filed.
Sec. 5. Failure to file a statement of claim within the time provided in section four shall not cause a
mineral interest to be extinguished if the owner of
such mineral interest:
1) was at the time of the expiration of the period
provided in section four, the owner of ten or
more mineral interests, as above defined, in
the county in which such mineral interest is
located, and;
2) made diligent effort to preserve all of such
interests as were not being used, and did within a period of ten years prior to the expiration of the period provided in section five
preserve other mineral interests, in said
county, by the filing of statements of claim
as herein required, and;
3) failed to preserve such interest through inadvertance, and
4) filed the statement of claim herein required,
within sixty (60) days after publication of
notice as provided in section six herein, if
such notice is published, and if no such notice
is published within sixty (60) days after receiving actual knowledge that such mineral
interest had lapsed.
Sec. 6. Any person who will succeed to the ownership of any mineral interest, upon the lapse thereof, may give notice of the lapse of such mineral interest by publishing the same in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which such mineral
interest is located, and, if the address of such mineral
interest owner is shown of record or can be determined upon reasonable inquiry, by mailing within ten
days after such publication a copy of such notice to
the owner of such mineral interest. The notice shall
state the name of the owner of such mineral interest,
as shown of record, a description of the land, and the
name of the person giving such notice. If a copy of
such notice, together with an affidavit of service
thereof, shall be promptly filed in the office of the
Recorder of Deeds in the county wherein such land is
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/4
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located, the record thereof shall be prima facie evidence, in any legal proceedings, that such notice was
given.
Sec. 7. Upon the filing of the statement of
claim, provided for in section four of this Act or the
proof of service of notice as provided in section six
of this Act in the Recorder's office for the county
where such interest is located, the Recorder shall record the same in a book to be kept for that purpose,
which shall be known as the "Dormant Mineral Interest Record" and shall indicate by marginal notation on the instrument creating the original mineral
interest the filing of the statement of claim or affidavit of publication and service of notice.
Sec. 8. The provisions of this act may not be
waived at any time prior to the expiration of the
twenty year period provided in section two.
The proposed statute eliminates the troublesome questions which have resulted in so much litigation in Louisiana
and which have not been resolved by existing legislation on the
subject.
It provides, for example, in section two that the geographical limitations upon a mineral interest are determined by
reference to the instrument in which the interest is created.
If the parties treat two or more tracts of land, whether they
be contiguous or noncontiguous, as a unit in a transaction
which results in the transfer of a mineral interest, the transferee will receive a single mineral interest. If a single transaction creates interests in more than one transferee, then as
many mineral interests are created as there are transferees.
Thus are obviated all the issues relating to contiguity of
tracts. 4
While the statute operates on coal and other minerals as
well as oil and gas, it does not interfere with present operational methods in those industries. It allows the interest to
be preserved beyond the twenty year period by several means,
including filing of a statement of claim, payment of taxes on
the interest, or production, and it defines production as including production from any part of a common seam or vein
64. See note 62 supra.
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of coal. Also eliminated are questions arising from pooling
and unitization in that the statute defines production as including production from any part of a unit with which the
land or any part thereof may be pooled.
The question of divisibility is resolved in favor of complete divisibility, but at the same time the unfairness that
results from divisibility under the Louisiana doctrine is eliminated by making the reversion operate in favor of the owner
of the interest out of which the terminating interest was
carved. The operation of these two related aspects of the
statute require some explanation and illustration.
The phrase "out of which it was carved" was taken from
the Tennessee statute where, as already indicated, it probably
has no special meaning. Here, however, it is meant to indicate the subdivider or person who created the mineral interest. Since there may be many subdivisions of a mineral interest subsequent to severance, each of which will create new
mineral interests, there may in a given situation be many
subdividers. The terminating interest will always operate in
favor of the immediate subdivider, so long as his interest
is being preserved. If the immediate subdivider's interest is
not being preserved, the reversion will operate in favor of
the subdivider at the next highest level. The only difficulty
with this scheme, and the one that requires elaboration on the
phrase "out of which it was carved," arises out of the situation in which a mineral interest owner transfers his entire
interest to two or more persons at the same time. In that
situation it would be difficult to determine which grantee
was the owner of the interest out of which all were carved.
The problem would arise if only one of the interests lapsed
under the statute. In that situation it could be argued that,
in the absence of elaboration upon the phrase "out of which
it was carved," the reversion should operate in favor of the
surface owner (or the next higher subdivider as the case may
be) because the subdivider who carved out the interests at
the same time disposed of all his interest. Here, however, as
in any other case, there is no reason why the surface owner
(or next higher subdivider) should profit merely because of
1:s ubdivision,- The subdividees here collectively received the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/4
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whole interest, and each should be considered to own a portion
of the interest out of which each of their interests were carved.
If one of their interests lapses, it should accrue to the benefit
of those who remain. The problem does not occur, of course,
if a given subdivider retains part of his interest even for a
short time for he will be considered to be the owner of the
interest out of which the rest have been carved. If he subsequently transfers the balance of his interest, he will at the
same time be transferring the potential reversion in the interests of his previous subdividees.
The operation of the statutory provisions relating to the
reversion of an interest upon termination can best be illustrated by a series of hypotheticals involving the various
methods by which a mineral interest may be subdivided.
(a) X, the owner of the entire fee interest in Blackacre, conveys the coal, oil and gas, and other minerals to Y. Thereafter, Y conveys to Z all of the
coal lying between 500 feet and 600 feet beneath
the surface. Y has mined coal from a seam lying more than 600 feet below the surface, and
that operation has continued to date. Z has never
mined any coal at all. Assume that no statements
of claim will be filed by either Y or Z in the
future.
Under the proposed statute, Y's interest will be kept alive as
long as production continues and for twenty years thereafter
(and for successive twenty year periods if Y should file a
statement of claim as provided in the act). On the other hand,
Z's interest which is a mineral interest as defined in the act,
will terminate at the end of twenty years if no statement of
claim is filed by Z. There is no reason why it should revert
to the Surface owner since, if there had been no conveyance
to Z, none of the mineral interests would be terminated. (Y
would be keeping the entire mineral interest alive by his production.) When Z's interest terminates it would seem logical
and fair that it would revert to Y, who has the residual interest in the whole of the mineral estate.
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(b) Assume the same facts as in the last hypothetical,
except that production is by Z rather than Y.
In this situation since Y and Z both have mineral interests,
as defined in the act, both must be kept alive either by production or by filing. Y's interest (assuming again that nothing is done to keep it alive) will terminate after twenty
years. Z's interest, however, will be kept alive for the duration
of his production and twenty years thereafter (and for successive twenty year periods providing the filing requirements
are met). When and if Z's interest terminates, it will revert
to the then owner of the surface because the surface owner
will have then succeeded to the ownership of the interest out
of which Z's interest was carved (the mineral estate previously owned by Y). An objection might arise on the basis
that if production by one of the owners in hypothetical (a)
will keep the whole interest alive, why doesn't it have the
same effect in hypothetical (b). To ask the question, however, is to confuse two issues: (1) when does the interest terminate; and (2) in whose favor does the reversion operate?
In both hypotheticals the two interests are being treated
separately for purposes of determining whether they are kept
alive by production. Only production under the particular
interest will keep it alive, and in each hypothetical the nonproducing interest terminated. After determining that an
interest terminates, it then becomes necessary to identify the
reversioner. In hypothetical (a) the owner of the interest
out of which it was carved was the mineral owner, Y. In
hypothetical (b) the surface owner occupied that position.
(c) X, the owner of the entire fee interest in Blackacre, conveys all "the coal, oil and gas, and other
minerals" to Y. Y thereafter conveys an undivided 1/2 interest therein to Z.
In this hypothetical, if Y is producing minerals, he will be
required to account to Z for 1/2, and Z will probably have to
contribute 1/ the costs of production. Thus, if Y's interest is
kept alive by producing, that same production would keep
Z's interest alive also. If, however, there is no production
and Y keeps his interest alive by filing a statement of claim
within the time provided in the Act, it might be argued, in the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/4
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absence of a definition of the phrase "out of which it was
carved" contained in Section one of the act, that Z's interest
would terminate and further that it would revert to the surface owner rather than to Y. The argument would be that
this was not a situation in which an interest was carved out;
the subdivider simply split his interest in two parts. In response to this, however, it should be pointed out that the surface owner was not a party to the conveyance from Y to Z and
should not profit from it. This is the approach taken by the
statute, and under the statute Z's interest will terminate in
favor of Y.
Again, as in hypothetical (b), if Z's interest rather than
Y's is preserved this time by filing and Y's is extinguished
because of a failure to file, the ownership of the extinguished
interest will revert to the surface owner for the same reasons.
In this situation the owner of the interest out of which Y's
interest was carved is the surface owner.
(d) X, the owner of the entire fee interest in Blackacre, conveys all the coal, oil and gas, and other
minerals to Y. Y thereafter, in a single transaction, conveys all his interest to A, B and C as
tenants in common.
In this hypothetical, if there is no production and A fails to
preserve his interest by filing, the reversion will operate in
favor of his co-owners, B and C, equally. Such a result follows
from the last portion of section one of the act. Since Y transferred his entire interest in one transaction, his grantees
collectively become owners of the interest out of which their
interests were carved. Had Y transferred undivided 1/3 interests to A and B in one transaction and then subsequently
transferred his retained one-third to C, a different result
would have obtained. In the latter situation C would have
succeeded to the interest out of which the interests of A and
B were carved, and, if one of them failed to preserve, the
reversion would be to C.
(e) X, the owner of the entire fee interest in Blackacre, a 100 acre tract, conveys all the coal, oil and
gas, and other minerals to Y. Thereafter, Y conPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972
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veys to Z all the coal, oil and gas underlying the
west fifty acres of Blackacre.
If there is production from neither of the tracts, it seems clear
that both Y and Z will have to file statements of claim in
order to preserve their interests. If only Y files, then the reversion of Z's interest should be in favor of Y. If only Z files,
the reversion of Y's interest should be in favor of the surface
owner. The arguments in this situation would seem to be a
little different than those involved in the situation in which
the subdivision was by conveyances of undivided interests.
If there is production from either of the halves of the tract,
the result is somewhat different than in the hypothetical involving undivided interests. Since Y and Z do not have a
joint or common interest, production by one of them will not
be considered production by both. Thus it would seem that
production by only one of the two mineral owners would not
operate to preserve the interest of the other. The nonproducing interest would have to be preserved, if at all, by filing a
statement of claim. If it is not preserved by filing, however,
there is no reason why the identity of the reversioner should
not be the same as it would have been in the situation where
there was no production, i.e., Y, if the expiring interest is
Z's; the surface owner, if the expiring interest is Y's. If in
this hypothetical, instead of conveying part of his interest to
a single grantee, Y had in a single transaction conveyed his
entire interest to two grantees by giving one of them the
minerals under the south half of the property, and the other
the minerals under the north half, the result would be the same
as that obtained when the entire interest was transferred to
two or more persons in the form of undivided interests in the
whole. Each of the grantees would hold part of the reversion
and, if one failed to preserve his interest, the other would
succeed to it upon its termination.
In any of the above hypotheticals the situation will be
greatly complicated if the transfers involved are term mineral
deeds rather than conveyances of interests perpetual in duration. Consider for example the following:
(f)

In 1950 X, the owner of the entire fee interest
in Blackacre, a 100 acre tract, conveyed the oil
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and gas and other minerals to Y for a term of
twenty years and as long thereafter as oil and gas
are produced from the premises. In 1952 Y conveyed to Z all the oil and gas and other minerals
underlying the west fifty acres of Blackacre for
twenty years and as long thereafter as oil and
gas are produced from the premises.
In this situation, if there is no production from any part of
the premises during the twenty year period after the execution
of the deed to Y, both mineral interests would expire pursuant
to the provisions in the deed to Y. There would be no occasion
for the statute to operate. If Y obtained production on his
fifty acres within the twenty year term of his deed and it continued thereafter but there was no production from the fifty
acres transferred to Z within the twenty year term of that
deed, Z's interest would terminate in favor of Y. Again the
statute would not be involved. If, however, the production was
from the fifty acres transferred to Z and it continued beyond the twenty year term in Z's deed, a more difficult problem arises. The production by Z will extend the term of Y's
mineral deed. 5 Will it prevent Y's interest from lapsing?
The problem lies in the fact that Y has, under the terms of the
deed to Z, a reversionary interest in Z's tract. When production ceases, Z's interest reverts to Y under the terms of the
deed and quite apart from the operation of the statute. It
might be argued that Z's production inures to the benefit of
Y for that reason. Since Y is not sharing in that production,
however, it would seem that his interest should terminate at
the end of twenty years-his interest in the reversion of Z's
tract as well as his interest in the tract retained by him. Thus
after twenty years nonuser of Y's tract, the reversion under
the deed to Z would be owned by X. This problem might become critical if after Z has produced for more than twenty
years and Y had failed to preserve his interest by filing, production was obtained after the twenty year period on Y's
retained tract. It would seem that such production would belong to the landowner, X, and, if Z's production terminated
65. Dickerson v. Ray, 20 Ill. 2d 107, 169 N.E.2d 341 (1960).
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thereafter, the whole of the mineral interest would revert
to the landowner.
While mineral titles may present more complicated fact
situations than those contained in the foregoing hypotheticals, it will usually be possible in any given controversy to
break the problem down into several hypotheticals similar to
those presented. In any given situation the result of applying
the statute will be to terminate the rights of those who have
failed to demonstrate a continuing interest in the property and
to leave unimpaired the rights of those who have done so.
While the result will not always be to return the title immediately to the surface owner, it will be to place it in the
hands of one who is actively attempting to preserve his interest. When no one who has a right thereto is interested in
maintaining ownership of the severed mineral interest, it will
then return to the surface owner. The ends of marketability
are thus served in every instance, and at the same time the
concept of separate mineral ownership, even in perpetuity,
is preserved.
In the drafting of the statute representatives of coal companies were asked to participate. They unanimously objected
to any provisions which would automatically terminate their
interests merely because of the failure to file a statement of
claim. The basis of their objection was the fact that their
reserves in a given area may cover a great many surface
tracts and the title transactions creating the coal companies'
interests may be very complex and based upon documents of
great antiquity. In short, their files are in such shape that
they fear that they might neglect to file with respect to some
of the tracts in a given area, even though they might make
diligent effort to do so. If they failed to file with respect to
a given tract, it would leave a hole in the middle of an area
they might desire to mine. They were, therefore, prepared to
oppose any statute which did not make an "inadvertance"
exception to the filing requirement. In the alternative, they
desired that the statute contain a requirement that the surface
owner bring suit to terminate the interest, after which they
would be given the opportunity to cure their default (some66. See, e.g., Union Sulphur Co. v. Campbell, 207 La. 514, 21 So.2d 626 (1945).
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thing similar to the Virginia statute). It was realized, however, that any general exception to the filing requirement
based on inadvertance would destroy the effect of the statute.
No title would ever be cleared without a lawsuit. The requirement of a lawsuit under the Virginia-type statute was, of
course, the objection to that statute. As a result, a compromise was reached which makes a narrow exception in favor of
the owner of a large number of mineral interests in a given
area who has made diligent effort to preserve all of them by
filing but has omitted through inadvertance to file as to one
or more of such interests. Realizing that even that kind of an
exception would leave titles in an uncertain state, a provision
was added whereby the reversioner could publish notice of the
lapse of the mineral interest, and if no statement of claim was
filed within sixty days after such publication the defense of
inadvertance would be cut off. Filing by the reversioner of
proof of publication would afford a means of automatically
clearing title. It is realized that publication of notice will
entail some expense, and the effectiveness of the act is thereby somewhat reduced. However, it is felt that this method is
far preferable to requiring litigation in every instance. While
it might be argued that no exception at all should be made in
favor of the coal companies, it is no doubt true that their
position has been responsible for the emasculation of the Virginia statute and the failure of the other statutes to include
coal rights within their operation. It was thus deemed that
a compromise statute would be better than no statute at all or
a statute that only affected interests in oil and gas.
CONCLUSION

While the statutory scheme proposed herein may seem
complex, the complexity is not in the statute but in the transactions which the statute seeks to govern. One need only read
a few of the Louisiana cases on this subject to realize just how
complicated mineral ownership can get. The Louisiana cases
make amply clear, however, that there can be no simple solution to the problem, or at least not one which produces a set
of consistent and desirable results. It is submitted that the
proposed statute does deal effectively and fairly with the probPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972
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lem without at the same time operating with undue harshness
upon any of the interests involved. While there may arise
unforeseen problems under it, most of the cases litigated heretofore have been obviated.
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